Will the “Law of Borders” be rewritten?

The case concerning the CHP congress has been postponed. The dismissal of the Istanbul administration as a "precautionary measure" was rightly considered a "rehearsal" for the congress case. At least the feared hearing on September 15th did not materialize. However, the danger is not over; the case has been postponed until October 24th, and we must be prepared for any outcome.

There's no doubt that the judicial siege targeting the CHP, particularly the congress case, has a critical political function beyond the outcome of the cases. While Erdoğan has stated, "We as the AKP are not involved," the question, "Who benefits most from this?" has an undeniable answer: Erdoğan and the AKP.

What happened to Ekrem İmamoğlu alone is enough to provide this answer. İmamoğlu's right to engage in politics has been obstructed since March 19th. As if that weren't enough, his university degree was revoked due to a simple transfer he made 35 years ago, losing one of the requirements for his presidential candidacy. He's also facing a "idiot" case. If his sentence is upheld on appeal, he will be banned from politics. In other words, his surroundings are like a minefield; if he escapes one, another will explode.

If this had happened to an ordinary citizen with no political aspirations, we would have dismissed it as a "coincidence." But the person deprived of his political rights, for some reason, is the country's most powerful opposition presidential candidate. Not one case , not two. From the moment he was elected Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on March 31, 2019, İmamoğlu has been facing judicial practices that have turned against him.

The judiciary is so heavily involved in political competition through the investigations it opens, interim and final decisions it issues, and the judicial measures it implements or fails to implement, that the CHP's political landscape and relationship with the masses are being shaped by this interference. The CHP is forced to become a party of reaction and defensiveness. This is, in fact, the key point.

The negative relationship between the judiciary and the CHP demonstrates that Erdoğan, with the power he wields within the state, can do far more than simply govern the country and his own party. Erdoğan also decides how the opposition will oppose, or rather, what they will be obligated to do. Knowing that he cannot restrain an opposition that rises on the country's problems, he is working on a CHP design that is preoccupied with its own problems.

It's easy to define, but not so easy to counter. Imagine you're out sweeping your street to remove the unpleasant smell from outside, but suddenly your house is flooded. In this situation, you need to rethink your priorities. Even though you don't give up on eliminating the smell, you prioritize cleaning your house.

The dilemma Erdoğan is facing the CHP is a similar one. As last year's local elections demonstrated, the country's deep-seated problems are accelerating the flight from power, while the CHP's social standing is growing. However, the judiciary's actions are driving the CHP back into its own home, confining it to four walls. Erdoğan, meanwhile, is making propaganda, saying, "Look, the CHP is drowning in internal chaos; how can it govern the country?"

What remains for the opposition from all this is the danger of being "stuck in a bubble." The will expressed since March 19th was politically correct and appropriate; however, it should not be forgotten that the opposition's potential is much higher under current Turkish conditions.

Using certain collaborators to force the CHP into the corridors of the courthouse and keep it preoccupied with itself is the most fundamental pillar of the regime's strategy, built on preventing opposition politics from establishing an organic connection with the public reaction stemming from economic and social problems. The next step in this goal is to fragment the CHP from within and divide its opposition base.

Therefore, while we must not deny the importance of engaging with crowds in public squares, we must not overlook the opposition's need to expand its political boundaries. To paraphrase one of our cult films, during the AKP's rule, the "Law of Borders" brought about a distribution of social power determined by identity politics. Political balances were established upon this unwritten law.

This is the first time the opposition, in general, and the CHP in particular, have seriously challenged existing borders in 22 years. Based on this, it's possible to interpret Erdoğan's dwindling public support as an attempt by the CHP to "violate borders." We are facing the reality of an opposition that has approached those the AKP considers "loyal" for the first time, aiming to connect with large segments of the population who are becoming impoverished, workers struggling to make ends meet under harsh conditions, and young people who have been rendered unemployed and alienated from their future.

The path to change in Türkiye lies not only in resisting oppression but also in accessing the sociological potential we've discussed. If the vicious cycle can be broken, the moves made through the judiciary will not have the devastating effects planned, and may even fail by triggering different dynamics in politics.